In recent years, neural networks have been extensively deployed for computer vision tasks, particularly visual classification problems, where new algorithms reported to achieve or even surpass the human performance. Recent studies have shown that they are all vulnerable to the attack of adversarial examples. Small and often imperceptible perturbations to the input images are sufficient to fool the most powerful neural networks. Advbox is a toolbox to generate adversarial examples that fool neural networks in PaddlePaddle, PyTorch, Caffe2, MxNet, Keras, TensorFlow and it can benchmark the robustness of machine learning models. Compared to previous work, our platform supports black box attacks on Machine-Learning-as-a-service, as well as more attack scenarios, such as Face Recognition Attack, Stealth T-shirt, and DeepFake Face Detect. The code is licensed under the Apache 2.0 license and is openly available at https://github.com/advboxes/AdvBox.
INTRODUCTION
Deep learning (DL) has made significant progress in a wide domain of machine learning (ML): image classification (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014; He et al., 2016) , object detection (Redmon et al., 2016; Redmon & Farhadi, 2017) , speech recognition (Graves et al., 2013; Amodei et al., 2016) , language translation (Sutskever et al., 2014; Bahdanau et al., 2014) , voice synthesis Oord et al. (2016) ; Shen et al. (2018) . Szegedy et al. first generated small perturbations on the images for the image classification problem and fooled state-of-the-art deep neural networks with high probability (Szegedy et al., 2013) . These misclassified samples were named as Adversarial Examples. A large number of attack algorithms have been proposed, such as FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014) , BIM (Kurakin et al., 2016) , DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016) , JSMA (Papernot et al., 2016b) , CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) , PGD (Madry et al., 2017a) .
The scope of researchers' attacks has also gradually extended from the field of computer vision (Fischer et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2017; Jia et al., 2020) to the field of natural language processing (Ebrahimi et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2018) and speech (Carlini & Wagner, 2018; Qin et al., 2019; Yakura & Sakuma, 2019) .
Cloud-based services offered by Amazon 1 , Google 2 , Microsoft 3 , Clarifai 4 and other public cloud companies have developed ML-as-a-service tools. Thus, users and companies can readily benefit from ML applications without having to train or host their own models (Hosseini et al., 2017a) . Unlike common attacks against web applications, such as SQL injection and XSS, there are very special attack methods for machine learning applications, e.g., Adversarial Attack. Obviously, neither public cloud companies nor traditional security companies pay much attention to these new attacks and defenses (Goodman & Hao, 2020; Goodman & Wei, 2019; a; Goodman & Hao, 2019; Goodman, 2020; Goodman et al., 2018) .
In this paper, we will focus on adversarial example attack, defense and detection methods based on our AdvBox. Our key items covered:
• The basic principles and implementation ideas.
• Adversarial example attack, defense and detection methods.
• Black box attacks on Machine-Learning-as-a-service.
• More attack scenarios, such as Face Recognition Attack, Stealth T-shirt, and Deepfake Face Detect.
RELATED WORK
Currently, several attack/defense platforms have been proposed, like Cleverhans (Papernot et al., 2016a) , FoolBox (Rauber et al., 2017) , ART (Nicolae et al., 2018) , DEEPSEC (Ling et al., 2019) , etc. For a detailed comparison, see the Table 1 . 
The function of a pre-trained classification model F , e.g. an image classification or image detection model, is mapping from input set to the label set. For a clean image example O, it is correctly classified by F to ground truth label y ∈ Y , where Y including {1, 2, . . . , k} is a label set of k classes. An attacker aims at adding small perturbations in O to generate adversarial example ADV , so that F (ADV ) = F (O), where D(ADV, O) < , D captures the semantic similarity between ADV and O, is a threshold to limit the size of perturbations. For computer vision, D usually stands for Perturbation Measurement.
PERTURBATION MEASUREMENT
l p measures the magnitude of perturbation by p-norm distance:
(1) l 0 , l 2 , l ∞ are three commonly used l p metrics. l 0 counts the number of pixels changed in the adversarial examples; l 2 measures the Euclidean distance between the adversarial example and the original sample; l ∞ denotes the maximum change for all pixels in adversarial examples.
ADVBOX 4.1 OVERVIEW
Advbox is a toolbox to generate adversarial examples that fool neural networks in PaddlePaddle 6 , PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2019) , Caffe2 7 , MxNet 8 , Keras, TensorFlow (Abadi et al., 2016) and it can benchmark the robustness of machine learning models.
STRUCTURE
Advbox is based on Python 9 and uses object-oriented programming.
ATTACK CLASS
Advbox implements several popular adversarial attacks which search adversarial examples. Each attack method uses a distance measure(L1, L2, etc.) to quantify the size of adversarial perturbations. Advbox is easy to craft adversarial example as some attack methods could perform internal hyperparameter tuning to find the minimum perturbation. The code is implemented as advbox.attack.
MODEL CLASS
Advbox implements interfaces to Tensorflow (Abadi et al., 2016) , PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2019) , MxNet (Chen et al., 2015) , and PaddlePaddle 10 . Additionally, other deep learning framworks such as TensorFlow can also be defined and employed. The module is use to compute predictions and gradients for given inputs in a specific framework.
AdvBox also supports GraphPipe 11 , which shields the underlying deep learning platform. Users can conduct black box attack on model files generated by Caffe2 12 , CNTK 13 , MATLAB 14 and Chainer 15 platforms. The code is implemented as advbox.model.
ADVERSARY CLASS
Adversary contains the original object, the target and the adversarial examples. It provides the misclassification as the criterion to accept a adversarial example. The code is implemented as advbox.adversary.
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
Advbox supports 6 attack algorithms:
• FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014) • BIM (Kurakin et al., 2016) • The code is implemented as advbox.attack. JSMA are often used as a baseline l 0 attack algorithm. CW are often used as a baseline l 2 attack algorithm. FGSM and PGD are often used as a baseline l ∞ attack algorithm.
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK MITIGATION
Advbox supports 6 defense algorithms:
• Feature Squeezing (Xu et al., 2017) • Spatial Smoothing (Xu et al., 2017) • Label Smoothing (Xu et al., 2017) • Gaussian Augmentation (Zantedeschi et al., 2017) • Adversarial Training (Madry et al., 2017b) • Thermometer Encoding (Buckman et al., 2018) The code is implemented as advbox.def ense. Adversarial Training is often used as a baseline defense algorithm.
ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION TEST
We independently developed a sub-project Perceptron 16 to evaluate the robustness of the model. Perceptron is a robustness benchmark for computer vision DNN models. It supports both image classification and object detection models as AdvBox, as well as cloud APIs. Perceptron is designed to be agnostic to the deep learning frameworks the models are built on.
Perceptron provides different attack and evaluation approaches:
• CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) • Gaussian Noise (Hosseini et al., 2017b) • Uniform Noise (Hosseini et al., 2017b) • Pepper Noise (Hosseini et al., 2017b) • Gaussian Blurs Yuan et al., 2019) • Brightness Yuan et al., 2019) • Rotations (Engstrom et al., 2017) • Bad Weather (Narasimhan & Nayar, 2000) 5 ATTACK SCENARIO Compared to previous work (Abadi et al., 2016; Rauber et al., 2017; Nicolae et al., 2018; Ling et al., 2019) , our platform supports more attack scenarios, such as Face Recognition Attack, Stealth T-shirt, and DeepFake Face Detect.
SCENARIO 1: FACE RECOGNITION ATTACK
We chose a pre-trained FaceNet (Schroff et al., 2015) model that is a state-of-the-art and widely used face recognition system as our white box attacked model. We used gradient-based attacks methods and modify its loss function using FaceNet embedding distance.
As shown in Fig. 1, Fig. (a) and Fig. (b) can be correctly identified, but Fig. (c) is incorrectly identified. 
SCENARIO 2: STEALTH T-SHIRT
On Defcon China (Goodman et al., 2019a) , we demonstrated T-shirts that can disappear under smart cameras. We open source the programs and deployment methods of smart cameras for demonstration. To raise people's awareness of techniques that can deceive deep learning models, we designed this "Stealth T-shirt" with the adversarial pattern to fool an object detector. The T-shirt is capable of hiding a person who wears it from an open-source object detector. By wearing it and showing the adversarial pattern in front of a camera and its object detector behind it, the person who wears it disappears, whereas the person who doesn't wear the T-shirt is still under object detector detection.
When the smart camera recognizes a human body in the video, it uses a green box to mark the range of the human body. Assume that the black piece of paper in the Fig. 2 is part of the T-shirt. As shown in Fig. (a) , the black piece of paper covered the gray man, but did not cover the man in red. The man in red was identified, and the man in gray was not identified. As shown in Fig. (b) , the black piece of paper blocked the man in red, and the man in gray was not covered. The man in gray was identified, and the man in red was not identified. As shown in the Fig. 3 , unlike the previous work (Thys et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2019) , the picture we need to print in the T-shirt is smaller, facing the distortion, folding, turning, the attack effect is more robust.
SCENARIO 3: DEEPFAKE FACE DETECT
We have opened the DeepFake detection capability for free, and you can remotely call our cloud detection detection api by using the Python script we provide. Deepfake is a branch of synthetic media in which a person in an existing image or video is replaced with someone else's likeness using artificial neural networks 17 . Details of our related work can refer to the conference c) . Figure 4 : An example of deepfake technology: actress Amy Adams in the original (left) is modified to have the face of actor Nicolas Cage (right).
